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This paper aims to investigate the transition to a new energy system based on hydrogen in 
the  European  liberalized  framework.  After  analyzing  the  literature  on  the  hydrogen 
infrastructure needs in Europe, we estimate the size and scope of the transition challenge. 
We  take  the  theoretical  framework  of  network  economics  to  analyze  early  hydrogen 
infrastructure needs. Therefore, several concepts are applied to hydrogen economics such 
as demand club effects, scale economies on large infrastructures, scope economies, and 
positive  socio-economical  externalities.  On  the  examples  of  the  electric  and  natural  gas 
industry formation in Europe, we argue for public intervention in order to create conditions to 
reach  more  rapidly  the  critical  size  of  the  network  and  to  prompt  network  externalities 
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Introduction 
Hydrogen  produced  from  renewable  sources  and  used  in  fuel  cells  for  different 
applications  has  the  potential  to  revolutionize  the  future  energy  sector  in  a 
sustainable way. Even though hydrogen production is still more costly than for other 
fuels—particularly  gasoline  for  transportation—recent  technology  improvements  in 
production and high oil prices have improved its economics. Many fuel cell producers 
have recently announced the cost of the fuel cells is approaching a competitive level, 
and some demonstration projects are already on the road all over the world. Although, 
without the infrastructure it is not likely that hydrogen and fuel cell technology can be 
diffused into the market (especially for transportation). Without infrastructure there 
will  be  no  demand  for  hydrogen  and  fuel  cell  technology,  and  in  that  situation 
automotive companies will be unwilling to supply fuel cell cars. On the other hand, 
without  demand  there  will  be  no  private  agents  interested  in  building  up  the 
infrastructure. This is the so-called “chicken-or-egg” dilemma. 
The infrastructure problem is not new in the history of the network industries. 
Several examples in history show that new infrastructures were built when they were 
required  to  overcome  a  national  “strategic  need.”  This  was  the  case  of 
interconnections for telecommunications, railways for trains, and even the electricity 
grid and natural gas pipelines in the energy sector. Each of these infrastructures has 
in  common  high  initial  costs  with  large  uncertainties  in  demand  uptake  and  the 
recovery  period,  which  makes  it  unlikely  that  private  agents  will  be  interested  in 
pursuing the investments. Hence, traditionally the State built the networks under the 
argument of the common interest.  
In  the  newly  liberalized  European  framework,  financial  burdens  and 
international competition rules make it almost impossible for the government to build 
a new energy infrastructure on its own. At the same time, it is still unclear how the 
market will provide the investment needed to build the infrastructure and who will 
organize it. 
This paper aims to discuss the early hydrogen infrastructure transition in a 
market framework. More precisely, we focus on the following questions: How does 
the infrastructure evolve? ; What should be the role of public authorities leading up to 
the  transition?  .  For  answering  those  questions,  in  section  one,  we  present  the 
challenges of building up a hydrogen infrastructure in Europe and the likely transition 
pattern according to the literature. In sections two and three, we develop the network 
economic approach and we apply it to the evolution of the electric and natural gas 
industry in Europe. Finally, in section four, we use the insights from the early points 
to prospect the hydrogen transition. We argue that a strong intervention of public 









































7  3 
1. Hydrogen infrastructure challenges 
Unlike oil, natural gas or coal, hydrogen is not an energy source but is rather an 
energy  carrier.  Like  electricity,  it  must  be  produced  and  transmitted  to  the 
consumption place in order to deliver an energy service (stationary, mobile, portable) 
using fuel cells technology. Hydrogen transmission requires an infrastructure. (Figure 
1)  In  the  case  of  mobile  applications,  hydrogen  stations  should  be  provided  in  a 
sufficient  number  and  appropriately  distributed.
1 The  problem  is  that  there  is  no 
demand if the network is not available; and there is no agent (energy companies, 
equipment manufacturers,…) providing infrastructure and technology until there is no 
sufficient  demand.  This  is  the  so-called  "chicken-or-egg"  dilemma.  Therefore,  a 
transition must be organized in order to make both sides (supply and demand) evolve 
at the same time, reducing their risks and costs.  
In the case of centralized production, the overall hydrogen cost at the consumption 
point includes the cost at each stage of the chain: production, storage, transport, 
distribution  and  finally,  the  hydrogen  station.  Otherwise,  production  can  be 
decentralized by creating stations equipped with natural gas reformers for hydrogen 
production.  Even  though  forecourt  production  costs  may  be  more  expensive 
(diseconomies of scale, more expensive inputs,...), it is not necessary to build up an 
infrastructure. At the end, the pathways choice will depend on resources availability 
(inputs  prices),  quantity  flow,  demand  density  (transmission  cost),  and  forecourt 
production costs. Hence, the choice of the pathways must take into account the local 
specificity and there is no unique solution to any problem.
2 
 
Figure 1 The hydrogen chain in the case of centralized production 
 












However,  the  transition  strategy  would  follow  more  or  less  the  same  pattern 
regardless of the context given that it’s always a matter of setting up an infrastructure 
with high uncertainty on the demand response. On the one hand, if there are already 
energy infrastructures in place - particularly for the natural gas - they should be used 
for  hydrogen  transmission  when  it  is  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  where  new 
infrastructure must be fully implemented, first networks should be decentralized and 
                                                 
1 cf. Melaina, 2003. 























































7  4 
hydrogen produced in site. As the forecourt production is less intense in capital, it 
can respond more effectively to the demand growth. Later on, demand can expand 
and thereafter justify building up a large production unit and the establishment of the 
infrastructure. The infrastructure should be built basing on an incremental approach, 
as demand increases and becomes sufficiently large, in order to avoid investing in 
overcapacity. However, even if there is no sufficient demand in the transport sector at 
the beginning, the economics of a large hydrogen plant can still be improved if there 
are other uses for hydrogen such as ammonia manufacturing or market for heat and 
power.  
In Europe, the official goals for the hydrogen and fuel cells market penetration reflect 
the conclusions of the report of the High Level Group (HLG, 2003) charged to create 
a  vision  for  hydrogen  in  Europe.  Particularly  for  the  transport  sector,  the  targets 
usually considered are: 5% of all new cars by 2020 (or 2% of the fleet by that time); 
25% by 2030 (or 15% of the fleet); and 35% by 2040 (or 32% of the fleet). Since that, 
many  studies  have  tried  to  estimate  infrastructure  costs  and  discuss  the  best 
strategies to get from here to there. 
The project “HyWays" is the largest analysis of the hydrogen infrastructure already 
done for Europe. In 2007, the roadmap of the hydrogen introduction in Europe was 
presented  by  the  consortium.  The  project  aimed  to:  identify  the  first  consumption 
centers in Europe; analyze the development of the infrastructure at the regional level; 
and assess the necessary investments in infrastructure over time. The analysis take 
into  account,  primarily,  the  profile  of  member  states  in  terms  of  infrastructure, 
domestic resources, socio-economic actors, etc. ; and secondly, the objectives of the 
European  policy  particularly  in  terms  of  hydrogen  penetration,  CO2  emissions 
reduction, diversification of the energy mix, and incorporation of renewable resources. 
According  to  the  assumptions  made  by  “HyWays”,  hydrogen  market  deployment 
follows  three  phases:  Phase  I,  pre-commercialization  (up  to  10,000  vehicles), 
characterized  by  a  few  large  center  demonstrations  in  Europe;  Phase  II,  initial 
marketing (10 .000-500.000 vehicles), there are two to five hydrogen consumption 
centers by country, and hydrogen stations start to build up in the main roads; phase 
III,  large-scale  commercialization  (  500,000  to  16  million  vehicles),  hydrogen 
infrastructure expands and enter into new areas. Hence, initially hydrogen starts in 
main consumption spots, and expands from there to other spots.  Later, those spots 
interconnect  themselves  and  hydrogen  keeps  extending  to  other  areas  increasing 
both geographical and population coverage. The total investment cost at the end of 
Phase III (2027) was estimated at 60,000 million euros. It was also reported that 
hydrogen  has  the  potential  to  halve  CO2  emissions  and  reduce  by  40 %  oil 
consumption in transportation in Europe by 2050. However, a strong policy support 
would  be  necessary  starting  as  soon  as  possible  (e.g.  R&D  development,  tax 
incentives,  market  niches,  partnerships  between  government,  manufacturers,  and 
suppliers). 
Other  studies  were  performed  in  order  to  estimate  the  cost  of  the  hydrogen 
infrastructure for Europe. These analyses confirm the need for large investments. 







































7  5 
Table 1 Synthesis of results of hydrogen infrastructure studies for Europe 
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In addition, technology costs must be substantially reduced in the coming years so as 
to make hydrogen competitive with energy substitutes. This is the conclusion of the 
hydrogen  prospective  study,  WETO-H2  (2007),  which  in  his  reference  scenario 
(maintaining  of  the  current  trends) forecasts  that  hydrogen  will  not  exceed  2%  of 
global  energy  consumption  in  2050  (3%  in  Europe).  In  the  "hydrogen"  scenario, 
characterized  by  carbon  constraints  and  very  optimistic  assumptions  concerning 
costs reductions in the hydrogen technologies, the proportion of hydrogen in the final 
energy consumption will not exceed 13% and 7%, respectively. This gives an idea of 
the  challenges  faced  by  the  hydrogen  today.  In  effect,  both  infrastructure  and 
technology challenges must be overcome before hydrogen can finally assume its role 
in the market. 
In conclusion, entry and penetration of the hydrogen into the market depends on the 
availability  of  the  infrastructure.  The  necessary  investments  are  very  expensive 
especially as uncertainties persist on technology and on demand behavior. In this too 
risky context, it seems unlikely that private companies (oil, gas, electricians, etc.) are 
interested to take over the investments alone. The involvement of the State seems to 
be therefore necessary for the creation and development of the hydrogen industry as 
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2. The economics of network industries 
Network industries often appear in the economic literature as a typical example of the 
application of the Walras-Pareto’s ideas on the role of the State in the economy. 
Under this approach, the market is the most efficient allocation of goods and factors. 
However, in the presence of externalities, public goods, or natural monopolies, the 
market does not obtain  an  optimal  equilibrium  in  the  sense  of Pareto. Therefore, 




2.1 Network externalities 
Network  is  a  spatial  interconnection  of  activities  and  equipments  technically 
compatible.
4 Networks  goods  are  types  of  goods  which  value  depends  on  the 
interaction created among economic agents. It raises the notion of externalities or 
external effects not captured by the market mechanism. An externality or external 
effect always happens when the activity of an economic agent benefits or imposes 
additional  costs  to  another  agent,  without  a  payment  for  the  benefits  or  a 
compensation for the added  costs. Given  that the  complete amount of  costs and 
benefits is not taken into account for the market equilibrium, this private equilibrium 
does not coincide with the social optimum. 
Network industries are characterized by the existence of network externalities. These 
external effects can be generated directly by increasing demand (the club effects), or 
indirectly  by  declining  commodity  prices  through  scale  economies,  or  improved 
quality  by  the  diversification  of  the  service.
5 Finally,  the  development  of  networks 
leads to positive effects on the overall economy. 
2.1.1 Club effects 
The  definition  of  club  effects  was  first  established  by  Buchanan  (1965)  for  those 
goods and services whose utility consumption depends on the number of users.
6 In 
the  case  of  club  goods,  individuals  increase  their  utility  when  the  number  of 
consumers of the club growth (up to the saturation point beyond which club effects 
are not anymore acting). 
Network goods are characterized by club effects. Katz and Shapiro (1985) noted that 
network user’s satisfaction increases with the number of members of the network.
7 
                                                 
3 cf. Guesnerie, 2006, p. 137. 
4 cf. Angelier, 2005, p.16. 
5 cf. Economides, 1995, p.6-7. 
6 “For any good or service, regardless of its ultimate place along the conceptual public-private spectrum, the 
utility that an individual receives from its consumption depends upon the number of other persons with whom he 
must share its benefits.” (Buchanan, 1965, p.3) 
7 “The surplus that a consumer derives from buying a unit of the good depends on the number of other agents 
who join the network associated with that product. When the good is durable, an individual’s consumption 
benefits will depend on the future size of the relevant network. Consumers will base their purchase decisions on 
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Also, the authors pointed out expectations on the future size of the network as a 
determinant of the network attractiveness. So, an expected wider size of the network 
provides a highest satisfaction among its users. 
Network  development  is  conditioned  by  club  effect  dynamics.  On  the  one  hand, 
network  externalities  are  the  source  of  increasing  returns  in  the  adoption,  which 
means that the spread of network goods does not follow a linear path, but rather an 
S-curve (Figure 2). On the other hand, in the presence of such externalities, multiple 
stable equilibriums are possible. Club effects can explain the rapid diffusion of the 
network as well as the failure in the diffusion, always when the network can not reach 
the critical mass and spread out from there. 
Figure 2 Typical diffusion of a network with club effects 
 
The spread of a network usually follows a succession of three different stages: (i) a 
slow start period until a minimum level is reached (critical mass); (ii) once the critical 
mass is reached, the "installed basis" membership increases the attractiveness of the 
network. The arrival of new users improves the network attractiveness contributing to 
more adhesions, in a feedback effect, conducing to a fast diffusion rate of the network; 
(iii) in the third stage, the potential for growth is exhausted, the network reaches the 
saturation point and the industry maturity is attained. 
Diffusion and survival of the network depends on whether the critical mass is reached 
or not. So, promoters of a new network should aim to reach the critical level as a 
minimum  target,  which  must  be  achieved  in  one  jump  step.  Otherwise,  the  only 
stable equilibrium will be the absence of the network.
8 
2.1.2 The effects of scale and scope 
The  high  capital  intensity  of  network  industry  is  a  source  of  many  effects  at  the 
operational level that can be fully exploited by chain integration. We will consider two 
of those effects: scale economies and scope economies. Scale economies are the 
basis for the classic explanation of natural monopolies. Scale economies exist when 
                                                 
8 Voir Katz et Shapiro, 1985; Economides, 1994. Curien (2000) points to the importance of not overpricing the 
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the increase of all production factors in the same proportion (increase in the scale of 
production), generates a proportionally higher increase in the production. Thus, the 
average production costs decrease with the scale of production or the production 
volumes.
9 
This feature is present in network industries such as telecommunications, electricity 
and  natural  gas.  Indeed,  the  development  of  networks  often  requires  the 
establishment of a heavy technical structure requiring high initial investments. So, the 
initial  fixed  costs  (sunk  cost)  are  very  important for  the final  price  of  the  service. 
Moreover,  the  marginal  cost  of  providing  services  is  often  constant  or  even 
decreasing  for  the  relevant  economic  quantities.  The  bulk  of  the  network  being 
established, the adhesion of a new membership contributes to expand club effects 
and sharing costs rather than increasing exploration costs. 
Scope economies are achieved by joint production of different goods or services, 
within the same company, through various production processes sharing a common 
input. In the presence of scope economies, producing n different goods or services 
separately becomes more expensive than producing them together given synergies 
in the production. 
Network  industries  are  heavily  influenced  by  scope  economies.  Indeed,  a  large 
network can attract the creation of several related activities, strengthening the utility 
of the network. A recent example of scope economies in network industries is the 
emergence of multi-utilities. For example, utilities of telephone, gas, electricity, etc., 
propose a multitude of services beyond their core product. This allows the utility to 
optimize  the  use of  its  infrastructure,  as  well  as  to  expand  the range  of  services 
offered to the clients. 
2.1.3 The dynamic effects on the economy 
Investing in public infrastructures such as transport infrastructure, telecommunication 
interconnections,  water  networks,  energy  networks,  etc…,  is  also  justified  by  the 
positive externalities generated for the economy. Thus, investment in infrastructure 
affects  the  product  directly  by  increasing  total  investments,  particularly  because 
public investment can be seen as an additional production factor in the economy. On 
the  other  hand,  new  infrastructure  generates  positive  externalities  in  terms  of 
aggregate output of the economy. Indeed, it allows for a more efficient functioning of 
markets,  which  benefits  to  all  business  and  citizens.  Finally,  investing  in  new 
infrastructure entails indirect effects for the economy through the increase of factors 
productivity (e.g. capital and labor). Even though public expenses in infrastructure 
can provoke a crowding out effect by decreasing demand of private factors, it also 
contributes  to  increasing  their  productivity.  Hence,  a  reduction  in  costs  and  an 
increase in the overall production would be expected.
10 
                                                 
9 cf. Angelier, 2002, p.70. 
10 See, per example : Hulten C.R. et Schwab R.M. (1993), « Infrastructure Spending : Where Do We Go From 
Here ? », National Tax Journal, 46(3), September, 261¬-273; and Barro R. (1990), “Government Spending in a 
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2.2 Natural monopoly 
An industry operates in a natural monopoly situation if a single company produces 
with  lower  costs  than  a  combination  of  smaller  companies.
11 In  the  case  of  the 
electric  power  industry,  for  example,  duplication  of  transmission  networks  to 
challenge the monopoly of transportation is not economical. In this case, competition 
(when  possible)  does  not  lead  to  a  cost-effective  solution  and  results  in  rather 
perverse  effects  in  terms  of  price  volatility.  In  this  situation,  we  observe  market 
failures  in  providing  an  efficient  allocation.  Therefore,  a  public  intervention  is 
necessary. 
The  natural  monopoly  may  have  different  sources,  most  of  them  related  to 
technological  externalities.  Thus,  it  may  be  associated  to  the  existence  of  strong 
scale economies (due to the weight of fixed costs and lower average costs induced 
by the growth of the scale of production); scope economies (relating to variable costs 
and reduced average costs with the diversification of final production); and network 
economies (related to interconnection and size effects); or even a combination of all 
these effects.
12 
Efficiency  can  be  severely  affected  in  the  case  of  a  stable  natural  monopoly 
(decreasing costs for all relevant quantities). The monopolist maximizes its profit by 
producing until marginal revenue equalized the marginal cost. Thus, the monopolist 
restricts the amount of market (q m) for a price higher than the competitive price, 
which would guarantee a rent. (Figure 3) However, this amount is below the level that 
optimizes  the  social  surplus  (q  *).  So,  from  a  social  point  of  view,  it  would  be 
desirable to increase production until the cost of the last unit evened the willingness 
to pay of the society, thus increasing social surplus by the gray area. 














                                                 
11 Lévêque , 2004, p.51; Braeutigam, 1989, p.1294. 
12 cf. Baumol et al., 1982 ; Curien, 2000. 
rente 


















































7  10 
In this context, the public authority must intervene in order to increase the social 
surplus. It can take one of the two modalities: regulating the private monopoly or 
through creating a public monopoly. 
 
3. The historical development of the electric and gas networks in Europe 
The  following  sections  analyze  the  evolution  of  the  electricity  and  natural  gas  in 
Europe.  This  analysis  illustrates  the  effects  of  the  network  externalities  on  the 
development of those industries, and more precisely, the role of the State on the 
development. Moreover, hydrogen introduction would have multiple interactions with 
both industries, particularly the natural gas one.    
3.1 The electric industry  
The evolution of systems such as electrical ones is not a mere question of technical 
change. The socio-political context also influences its development. Hughes (1983) 
points to the role of sociotechnological systems to highlight the interplay of internal 
and external factors within the evolution of the electric industry. 
The electric industry emergence in the four main countries of the Western Europe 
(Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain) began in the early 1880s. The period of 
major diffusion occurred before the 1980s. Until the 1980s, its development can be 
analyzed by the succession of three distinct stages: (i) the emergence of the industry, 
from the 1880s until the beginning of the First World War; (ii) enlarging markets and 
the beginning of the electricity policy in the period between the two World wars; and 
(iv) the operational harmonization and growth of domestic industries after the Second 
World War. (Figure 4) 
Figure 4 The evolution of the electrical industry in Europe 
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Source :  Angelier  and  Lalanne,  1979,  from  B.R.  Mitchell,  European  Historical  Statistics, 
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Since the  beginning,  the evolution  of  the electric  power  industry  has experienced 
different rhythms and paths depending on the country. These national specificities lie 
in the basis of different performances of the national electrical industries. Angelier 
and  Lalanne  (1979)  explain  these  differences  by  the  influence  of  three  factors: 
physic-economic country conditions; the origin of the capital and the means of its 
valorization; and the role of the States in the development of the industry. 
The emergence of the industry: 1880-1913 
Initially, the electric power industry was based on thermal and hydropower production. 
The initial purpose of electricity was to convert thermal energy into a form of energy 
more  suitable  for  certain  energy  needs  such  as  lighting.  Moreover,  governments 
aimed to replace imported energy by maximizing national resources such as hydro. 
Until the First World War, the main markets for electricity were lighting and public 
transportation. 
On the eve of the First World War, the power industry remains generally confined to 
major urban centers and industrial areas of high consumption, where consumption is 
spread over the whole day. The industry structure varies from one country to another: 
concentrated  in  Germany  and  Italy;  atomized  in  the  United  Kingdom;  and  highly 
concentrated in major consumer centers in France. The German electric industry is 
the most developed as compared to other electric industries in terms of electricity 
production,  costs  and  electricity  prices,  geographically  widespread  network  and 
diversification of the production mix.
13 
The enlargement of the industry: 1913-1938 
The second stage corresponds to the period between the two World wars. During this 
stage, the electric industry had realized substantial progress in transportation and 
production. From now on, electricity can be transported over long distances and in 
more  economical  conditions.  This  allowed  for  a  geographic  expansion  of  local 
networks into the regional framework, and later on, in a national framework with the 
interconnection of various regional electricity grids. The expansion of the market is 
also associated to the growth of the production scale and the introduction of new 
power generation technologies (e.g. turbine), improving therefore the efficiency in the 
use of the fuel in the generating station. 
During this period, electricity energy integrates the country energy consumption and 
contributes  to  economic  competitiveness  and  growth.  Firstly,  electric  power  was 
mainly used for industrial needs. Industrial demand accounts for more than two thirds 
of the electricity consumption (except in the United Kingdom where it provided only 
50%) between the World wars.
14 In fact, the growth in electric industries was linked to 
the electric motor ability to replace the steam engine in industrial use. 
Technological  advances  in  electricity  transport  and  removal  of  market  constraints 
allow  exploitation  of  the  economic  benefits  of  the  production  in  large  size  units. 
                                                 
13 cf. Angelier et Lalanne, 1979. 
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However, the establishment of a transport network and large power plants requires a 
huge amount of investments. This situation will influence the structure of the industry 
(towards greater concentration) and the need for the State intervention. 
The State intervention in the electricity industry in the period between the World wars 
took several modalities and different rhythms depending on the country. In Germany, 
public authorities, such as states and municipalities, are very active and hold large 
stakes in electric enterprises (strengthened after the economic crises of 1919 and 
1923 when public entities intervene in order to rescue companies in difficulty), or 
through greater federal State control over the industry. In Italy, the State is required 
to redeem industrial assets (including electrical assets) from three major Italian banks 
in  order  to  avoid  their  bankruptcy  after  the  financial  crisis  of  1933.  In  the  United 
Kingdom, the State puts the basis for the creation of the electric transport system. 
Similarly, it restructured the industry aiming to introduce greater competition between 
municipalities and private companies. In France, the State does not intervene directly 
in the resources allocation. The intervention stays more at the administrative level in 
order to guide business decisions.  
The performance of the national electric industries in this period can be measured by 
the cost and the price of electricity, as well as by the extent of transmission and 
distribution. The prices in Germany were among the lowest in Europe. On the eve of 
the World War II, Germany has a national interconnected network as well as a wider 
distribution network. The United Kingdom also possesses a wide transmission and 
distribution network, one of the best in Europe. 
The growth of national electric industries: 1945 - 1977 
After the War, the demand for electricity has been progressing. The share of the 
tertiary sector and the domestic demand for electricity increases by about one fifth in 
1950  to  half  in  1977.
15 This  structural  change  is  due  to  the  extension  of  the 
distribution networks covering a larger portion of the population, on the one hand; 
and by the increasing importance of services in the western economies, on the other 
hand. 
The third stage of the electric industry evolution is characterized by large and very 
capital intensive power plants. Hence, national organizations under increasing control 
of  the  State  were  created  in  Europe  aiming  to  harmonize  the  operation  and  the 
growth of electric industries. 
In the aftermath of World War II, electric companies were nationalized across Europe. 
Different factors explain that decision: the strategic importance of the electric power 
industry; electric industry characteristics approaching to a natural monopoly; the role 
of the industry as an instrument of the national economic policies. The power industry 
is nationalized in France and in the United Kingdom. In Italy, the State "nationalizes" 
the  industry  through  a  process  of  gradual  redemption  of  financial  investments  in 
electricity  companies.  By  contrast,  the  former  West  Germany,  and  particularly  its 
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central State, sold a part of its stake in public electric holdings to private companies, 
particularly to banks. 
 
The emergence and the "take-off" of a network industry such as the power industry 
have taken more than 60 years in the Western European countries. Before the World 
War II, national electric industries experienced different conditions of demand, supply 
(structure  and  technology)  and  of  institutional  environment.  The  State  had 
traditionally had an important role in the network development. This role was central 
in Germany and in the United Kingdom for the studied period, both countries having 
the  best  performing  electric  industry  in  Europe.  After  the World  War  II,  the  State 
becomes  the  central  player  in  the  industry  across  Europe.  It  coincides  with  the 
strongest growth rates that electrical industry ever knew. Public authorities integrated 
the entire chain in order to avoid bottlenecks for growth (e.g. standardization of the 
technology), to maximize the benefits from club effects and scope economies, and to 
overcome the critical size more rapidly. More recently, with the arrival of the industry 
to  maturity,  these  positive  effects  being  exhausted,  the  disadvantages  of  vertical 
integration become more clear (decrease of the specificity nature of the assets and 
bureaucratic  organization  inefficiencies).  At  this  time,  the  merits  of  the  integrated 
model  are  questioned  and  conditions  are  created  for  opening  up  the  industry  to 
private companies. 
 
Table 2 Summary of the historical development of the electric power industry in Europe: 1880 - 1977 
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3.2 The natural gas industry 
The natural gas industry has its origin in the town gas developed in the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth century. The gas mains for the town gas 
were firstly built in the major cities and then in smaller towns. Public and private 
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outlet  was  already  threatened  by  the  introduction of the  electric  lighting.  The  gas 
industry responds to the electricity competition by increasing horizontal and vertical 
integration. The competition with electricity continued until the gas industry found its 
next impetus for growth in calorific usage. In the 1920s, technological progress and 
excess production contribute to concentrate the production in more efficient large-
sized plants, putting basis for the creation of first transport networks at the regional 
level. Nonetheless, after the 1930s, the production modernization was not sufficient 
to  prevent  the  decline  of  the  manufacturing  gas  due  to  coal  scarcity  and  the 
competition from electricity and petroleum.   
This context marks the emergence of natural gas. Cleaner and having a better gross 
calorific  value,  natural  gas  was  also  a  cheap  energy  source  grace  to  the  major 
deposit discoveries of the 1950s and the 1960s across Europe. Furthermore, in the 
end  of  the  Second  World  War,  the  European  economic  reconstruction  required 
significant  amounts  of  energy.  The  first  transmission  and  distribution  networks  of 
natural gas were built in Europe by that time. The transportation networks kicked off 
linking  the  producing  areas  with  the  main  consumption.  In  large  cities,  the 
introduction of the natural gas was facilitated by the town gas infrastructure already in 
place, allowing a more rapid progress of the "new" gas in the city. 
While the town gas industry was generally limited to a local level, the natural gas 
industry  was  developed  at  a  national  scale.  In  fact,  the  government  intervention 
played a decisive role in the development of the natural gas industry. Hence, the 
natural  gas  experience  in  Europe  is  an  illustration  of  the  concurrence  weakness 
during the growth stages of network industries. Indeed, in a competitive environment, 
the search for a solvent demand - in order to maximize the return on investments - is 
often done without taking into account network externalities and long-term investment 
needs.
16 This behavior constraints the rhythm and the scope of the network industry 
evolution (e.g. energy, telecommunication, railways).  
The natural gas industry in the 1950s and 1960s 
Natural gas appears in a difficult context for the town gas. Since the 1930s, and after 
World War II, town gas does not stop of losing market share for electricity and oil. 
Natural  gas  comes  to  revival  the  gas  industry.  More  clean,  efficient  and  reliable, 
natural gas is also cheaper because of the discovery of large deposits in Europe.
17 In 
the late 1950s, Italy was ahead France, Austria and Germany in terms of the natural 
gas production.
18 
The resurgence of the gas industry thanks to natural gas is accompanied by a radical 
institutional  change  which  facilitates  the  transition.  In  fact,  the  major  gas  national 
firms were created after the Second War. In 1953, the Italian government created the 
national oil and gas company ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) which reorganizes the 
                                                 
16 cf. Angelier, 2007, p.65. 
17 Between 1938 and 1952, natural gas was discovered in the Po Valley, Italy. In 1951, the Lacq deposits were 
found in France, and the Slochteren in Groningen (Netherlands), in 1959. In 1965, the reservoir West Sole was 
discovered in the British side of the North Sea. In 1969, the reservoir Ekofisk was discovered in the Norwegian 
continental shelf of the North Sea. 
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sector  by  incorporating  the  firm  already  in  charge  of  the  transportation  and  the 
distribution of natural gas, SNAM (Società Metanodotti Nazionale). In France, the 
nationalization  law  of  electricity  and  gas  1946  set  up  a  national  company  for 
electricity (Electricité de France or EDF) and another one for gas (Gaz de France or 
GDF). GDF results from the merger of the other gas companies, excluding mixed-
capital and municipal companies. In the Great Britain, the Gas Act 1948 nationalized 
the entire  industry  of town  gas  and divided  it  into  a dozen  of  area  boards  under 
coordination  of  the  Gas  Council.  In  1973,  the  area  boards  and  the  Gas  Council 
merged  into  the  public  company  "British  Gas  Company."  The  company  was 
privatized and unbundled after 1986. In 1963, the Dutch State in partnership with 
Exxon  and  Shell  created  Gasunie,  the  company  responsible  for  production  and 
transportation of natural gas from the Groningen deposit. 
The public companies will convert and modernize the network of town gas, improving 
the  interconnection  of  inter-regional  networks  and  setting  transport  networks  for 
natural gas. 
The growth of domestic gas industries in Europe after the 1960s 
The natural gas industry in Europe is younger than in the United States. This industry 
appeared in Europe in the 1950s, that is about 30 years after the introduction of the 
first gas networks in the United States. The development of the natural gas in Europe 
benefited from: (i) the existence of the town gas infrastructure in major urban and 
industrial areas (e.g. Great Britain); (ii) local discoveries of natural gas; (iii) economic 
growth voracious in energy consumption, especially in industrialized regions as well 
as in high standards of living areas; and (iv) the authorities’ willingness to promote 
the new energy.
19 
Since the deposits discoveries, the natural gas has progressed very rapidly in the 
energy balances of the Western Europe. (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5 Natural gas market evolution 
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Author’s calculations from BP (2007). 
 
 
In the early 1960s, the natural gas industry is taking off in Europe while in North 
America it is already a consolidated industry, enjoying the third of the national energy 
mix. In Europe, natural gas has the greatest weight in Italy by meeting about 10% of 
total energy consumption. France and the Netherlands stand behind Italy in terms of 
penetration in the energy balance, while it is almost absent in the United Kingdom 
and Germany. 
The first stage, until 1975, is characterized by the highest growth rates in the history 
of the European gas industry, particularly in Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. For the latter, the share of natural gas in the energy balance raised 
from  5%  to  almost  50%  between  1965  and  1975.  This  energy  revolution  on 
Netherlands can be explained by the discovery of the Groningen deposits in 1959. 
The second stage, between 1975 and 1985, is marked by the deceleration of the 
growth rhythm. The UK is the only country experiencing an important increase of the 
natural gas share in the energy balance (from 16% to 23% in 1975-1985), facilitated 
by a number of field discoveries in the British waters of the North Sea. The third 
stage, after 1985, is characterized by a new growth period, but this time at a lower 
rate than in the first period. The UK remains the country with the largest growth rates 
of  the  natural  gas  share.  However,  in  the  recent  years,  the  growth  rates  have 
become more unstable with the arrival to maturity of some fields in the North Sea. In 
Italy, natural gas is also increasing its share, passing from 28% in 1995 to 38% in 
2006, driven notably by the consumption of the electric power industry. In Germany, 
the market share of natural gas raised from 14% to 22% between 1985 and 1996, 
comparable to the growth during the first stage. The pattern of growth has slowed 
down since then and the market share grew only slightly mainly driven by residential 
and commercial consumption. In Netherlands, the market share of the natural gas 
has been declining after the late 1980s. On the contrary, the share of natural gas in 
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This is due primarily to the political engagement for the nuclear in response to the oil 
crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Historically, the gas industry in Europe is more concentrated than in North America. 
In fact, European markets have long been characterized by a two-level organization: 
(i)  upstream  (production  and  imports),  a  bilateral  oligopoly  formed  between 
producers-exporters  and  national  gas  companies  from  importer  countries;  and  (ii) 
downstream,  closed  national  markets  dominated  by  the  public  company.  In  the 
upstream, production is traditionally concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
exporters,  for  the  most  public  companies:  Algeria  (Sonatrach),  Norway  (Statoil), 
Russia (Gazprom) and the Netherlands (Gasunie). The development of the European 
natural  gas  network  since  the  1960s  is  correlated  with  the  new  import  contracts. 
Given the heavy investment required for production and transport infrastructures, as 
well as the vulnerability to the opportunistic behavior as a result of the specificity of 
the projects, long-term contracts were signed between the consortia formed by public 
European companies and exporters in order to finance the long-term projects. More 
precisely,  in  order  to  share  the  "price  risk"  and  the  "market  risk"  between  the 
counterparts. This institutional architecture enabled the development of stable and 
mature European supplies. In the downstream, the gas industry was developed in 
Europe in most of the cases in the framework of national public monopolies. The 
reasons evoked to justify the strong state intervention in the industry were mostly 
associated with macroeconomic goals (promoting employment and growth), security 
of supply and redistribution (social or geographical). In short, the two-level market 
structure  and  long-term  contracts  have  facilitated  the  realization  of  the  necessary 
investments in infrastructure, and thus the development of the gas industry. 
The  European  gas  markets  are  still  characterized  by  the  importance  of  national 
public companies. That is the case in France (GDF) and Italy (ENI). Moreover, in 
countries where the state is less present in the gas market (e.g. UK), the market 
structure is less integrated in the downstream compared to the former group. In a 
large number of countries, the gas distribution has been developed by regional or 
local authorities in the form of local distribution monopolies (e.g. in Germany, where a 
significant portion of the distribution is handled by the communes).
20 
The integrated structures have been challenged by the liberalization movement in the 
European gas market organized around two Directives, Directive 98/30 of June 1998 
and Directive 2003/55 of June 2003. These guidelines have introduced in the gas 
industry  the  principles  of  the  separation  (unbundling)  of  competitive  activities 
(especially in the production and trading) from the essential facility, the third-party 
access to networks and the pricing regulation of the activities remaining in monopoly. 
The goal is to create a competitive and integrated gas market in Europe, particularly 
between states and major suppliers (with gas-to-gas competition between different 
sources) that can ensure both energy security and supplies at more advantageous 
conditions. 
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4. Prospects for a transition to hydrogen 
Both electricity  and  natural  gas  appeared  to  reach a  point  of  critical  mass  in the 
market after which their respective market shares increased more rapidly. After this 
point, network externalities played an important role in both transitions. Natural gas 
could  diffuse  and  develop  quicker  because  of  the  availability  of  town  gas 
infrastructure in the main urban and industrial areas and the discoveries of natural 
gas  after  the  period  around  1950.  Electricity  could  diffuse  and  develop  quicker 
because  of  the  high voltage  transmission and  the turbine  introduction around  the 
1920s.  In  both  cases,  they  started  as  decentralized  networks  that  were 
interconnected  before  forming  regional  networks,  and  then  national  systems. 
Electricity  took about 60  years before  reaching  critical  mass and  diffusing  widely. 
Town gas failed to become a national energy and it was replaced by natural gas 
which needs just a few decades to diffuse in Europe countries. 
The diffusion of electricity beneficiated from the public recognition of the technology 
superiority  compared  to  gas  in  lighting  and  other  household  appliances.  The 
superiority of the electric motor under steam engine was decisive for the increasing 
of the electric consumption in the industry sector, which was the main driver of the 
electricity  progression  during  the  first  half  of  the  XXth  century.  The  technical 
progresses  in  production  and  in  the  electric  transmission  give  the  basis  for  the 
development  of  the  network  at  the  national  level.  Technical  progress  was  also 
important in the case of the natural gas. In fact, without the progress in steel industry, 
particularly in pipeline construction, the widespread of the natural gas network would 
not be possible.    
The  old  town  gas  infrastructure  was  an  important  feature  allowing  for  a  rapid 
penetration of the natural gas in the cities. Although, an infrastructure had to be built 
between the producing fields recently discovered and the main consumer areas after 
the 1950s. That infrastructure was generally built up by the national public company 
in Europe. The diffusion of the electricity after the World War II was possible thanks 
to  the  infrastructure  meanwhile  constructed.  It  was  possible  after  the  industry 
reorganization. In fact, most countries in Europe had integrated and nationalized their 
electric industry after the War.   
So, in both situations the government backed the establishment of the supporting 
infrastructure. In both cases it integrated the activities in a national company charged 
to develop the respective industry. A national organization under public control was 
created  in  the  electric  industry  charged  to  the  operational  harmonization  and  to 
growing the network coverage. In the case of the natural gas, the national company 
was  formed  in  order  to  organize  the  local  production  and  to  build  up  the 
infrastructures needed to serve users. Lately, the demand for natural gas increased 
and the European national organizations jointly created together networks for imports. 
The development of energy network industries often needs huge investments and 
implies long delays of recuperation of the capital before the network can reach the 
critical mass and diffuse by the network externalities. In this context it is unlikely that 
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therefore necessary as it was in the past for the natural gas and the electricity in 
Europe. 
The introduction of hydrogen needs both infrastructure and technology available. The 
infrastructure  is  needed  in  the  beginning  in  order  to  solve  the  “chicken-or-egg” 
dilemma and to reach the ‘critical mass’ after which the hydrogen diffusion is faster 
thanks  to  network  externalities  and  scale  economies.  In  the  case  of  hydrogen 
technologies, in particular fuel cells, they are being developed by public and private 
entities around the world. Progresses have been recently announced particularly in 
terms of durability and robustness of the fuel cell. Nonetheless, the competitive level 
is still far from being reached and the research and development (R&D) period has 
been taking decades without any significant entry in the market.
21  
In  the  case  of  a  radical  innovation  like  hydrogen  a  highly  public  intervention  is 
required  at  two  levels:  firstly,  to  support  the  pre-market  stages  (research  and 
development  and  demonstration  R&DD)  in  order  to  make  hydrogen  technologies 





Natural  gas  and  electricity  experience  in  Europe  as  well  as  techno-economical 
analysis  of  the  hydrogen  infrastructure  generally  converge  to  the  vision  that 
infrastructure starts in densely populated areas, with a huge demand potential, in a 
decentralized  production  configuration  and  then  evolves  towards  a  centralized 
production when the demand expands. Criteria such as economical status, existing 
natural  gas  and  grid  power  infrastructure,  and  hydrogen  by-product  availability 
nearby are frequently presented as preconditions for the choice of the regions where 
to  build  the  early  infrastructure.  Even  if  estimated  at  a  least-cost  way,  the 
infrastructure  is  estimated  to  cost  several  billions  of  euros.  This  huge  amount  of 
investment required to build the hydrogen infrastructure and the uncertainty about the 
demand uptake, make it unlikely that one private agent (or a group of them) can 
deploy  and  co-ordinate  the  necessary  infrastructure  to  overcome  the  “chicken-or-
egg” dilemma on their own. The same problem occurred on different occasions in the 
past when the state felt a strategic necessity to develop energy networks such as 
pipelines and power grids. There were also economical reasons for the state to build 
                                                 
21 Lattin and Utgikar (2007) present the hydrogen and fuel cells’ main efforts in the United States since 1970s. 
They conclude that without government intervention promoting the development of the technologies and 
creating economic incentives for the new energy system, the transition would not be possible.  
22 Both technology development and market-entry used to be supported by private investments in the case of 
incremental innovations. (Bourgeois and Mima, 2003, p.11) Nevertheless, Melaina (2003) notes that automotive 
infrastructure in the United States was generally supported by private investment. Bouwcamp (2004) takes also 
the example of the wireless communication to show the market can impose the better standard and private 
companies can afford the investment in the infrastructure. In both cases, the infrastructure is not entirely new. In 
the case of the automotive infrastructure, it started from the old infrastructure for the gasoline for the oven. In the 
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these networks on his own, such as scale economies, scope economies, club effects, 
and economic growth. 
Therefore,  public  authorities  have  an  important  role  to  play  during  the  hydrogen 
transition.  On  the  one  hand,  they  can  improve  the  context  for  the  introduction  of 
hydrogen into the market by: supporting R&D; economic instruments (e.g. carbon 
taxes, cap and trade); command and control policies (e.g. efficiency requirements, 
renewable  energy  requirements);  public  education;  and  codes  and  standards  for 
hydrogen technologies. On the other hand, historical review and network effects point 
out  that  more  direct  intervention  of  public  authorities  is  needed  during  the  early 
phases of the transition in order to reach rapidly the ‘critical mass’ and to release 
network externalities allowing for the market diffusion. This is true at the state level 
as  well  as  at  the  local  level.  Local  partnerships  between  public  authorities  and 
industry  can  be  very  important  for  the  transition  by  reducing  uncertainty  and, 
therefore, accelerating equipment deployment (such as fuel cell cars), while at the 
same time helping to ramp up investments in the infrastructure. 
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  Germany  Netherlands  France  Italy  Great Britain  United States 
Country type 
Importer  Producer ; Exporter  Importer  












3° Residential and 
commercial 
1° Residential and 
commercial 
2° Industry ; Power 
 
I. Industry ; energy 
II. Residential - tertiary ; 
Industry 
1° Industry 


























I. Gas Act 1948 : Area 
Boards (12), Gas 
Council ; 
II. Gas Act 1972: Public 
integrated company 
(British Gas) 
III. Privatization and 
unbundling of British 
Gas (1980s, 1990s) 
 










Public stake in 
distributiors 
Partner 












Transition to maturity  Maturity  Transition to maturity  Transition to maturity  Maturity  Maturity 
Diffusion  
(number of years before 
reaching 10 % of the 











10 y.  
(1920-1930)
24 
Annex 1 Summary of natural gas development in Europe and United States 
                                                 
23 According to the Estrada et al. (1995) methodology and to competition indicators such as market share, unbundling, etc., available in the French Energy Regulator’s 
site (www.cre.fr) and the European Regulators' Group for electricity and gas’ site (www.ergeg.org).   
24 Marchetti C., Nakicenovic N. (1979), « The Dynamics of Energy Systems and the Logistic Substitution Model”, RR-79- 13, December, IIASA, Laxenburg.  
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